A.S. is a woman who lives in a poor part of the city. For the past 20 years she has worked in various minimum-wage jobs. She currently earns $1,500 per month, which is barely enough for her to get by. A.S. encounters one of the study participation invitations that the Institute has posted on bulletin boards in her neighborhood. A.S. considers signing up for this study. She is on the fence about whether or not to do so. She is afraid of possible unexpected serious side effects of the vaccine. But then again, she would be paid [as much as she earns in her job in a day / almost as much as she earns in her usual job in an entire month / more than six times as much in her usual job in an entire month]. [Repetition of the above questions, introduced with "Researchers at the institute discuss offering payment for participation instead." Prospective subject described as "J.K. is a woman similar to A.S. She works in a minimum-wage job and encounters the study participation invitation."] For each of the following ways of compensating study participants, please indicate how ethically appropriate you think it is. Recall that the study test for side effects of a vaccine, an although nobody expects such side effects to occur, if this were known, there would be no need to run a study. Recall that there is no special compensation if side effects occur.
[Only in "arguments" condition: Please consider professional ethicists' argumentation: 1. By advertising to pay money to participants, the Institute might entice women to participate in the study who don't fully understand what they are getting into. 2. By advertising to pay money to participants, the Institute might lead people to participate in the study who would not otherwise choose to do so]
• Do not pay money for participation
• Pay $50 for participation
• Pay $1,000 for participation
• Pay $10,000 for participation
• Pay everyone the amount of money for participation that he would earn at his job in 40 hours. [Only in "arguments" condition: This means that an employee at McDonalds will be paid about $300 for participation whereas an attorney will be paid about $3,000.]
[Answer choices for each of the above compensation schemes: 7-point Likert scale with extremes labelled "completely unethical" and "completely ethical"] [Answer choices: "Yes", "No", "I do not know". In the first two of the above five question, the choice "prefer not to answer" was also available.]
Data Analysis
Survey We fielded the survey in the first two weeks of December 2012 on weekdays on Amazon Mechanical Turk with 1570 respondents. Each respondent was paid $1.50 lump sum, and additionally received an incentive payment of $0.25 for answering at least 3 out of 5 attention check questions correctly. We retain the 1445 respondents who answered all five questions correctly for analysis (92%). The average time to completion for these subjects is just over 12 minutes (s.e. 5 minutes and 25 seconds).
Stable types From each respondent we have three measures of approval for each payment amount:
(i) As a member of the IRB, to what extent would they approve of the study with the given payment amount, (ii) How much do they personally approve of the study with the given payment amount, and (iii) How ethical do they consider compensation with a given payment amount. While the first two of those questions were asked in immediate succession (but separated temporally for different payment amounts), the last was asked in the direct juxtaposition of the compensation schemes at the end of the survey. We define d k i as the difference in respondent i's approval of the payment of $10,000 vs. $1,000 according to question k. The Cronbach alpha coefficient of (
when including all respondents, and 0.77 and 0.84 on the subsamples of those who were not, and were given the arguments, respectively. These compare favorably to the standard benchmark of 0.8 (Kline (1999) ) and thus indicate high interitem correlation. As an alternative measure, we regress d less ethical than one of $1,000 do so consistently.
Classification As explained in the main text, we use d 3 to define a respondent's type. This is the most appropriate single variable for this purpose, since only for this variable were respondents asked to directly compare the ethical appropriateness of a payment of $10,000 compared to a payment of $1,000. In the full sample, there are 21% "ethicist" types, 34% neutral types and 44% "economist"
types. The corresponding numbers in the subsamples of those who were not, and were provided with the arguments, are 14%, 32%, 57%, and 27%, 39%, 34%, respectively.
Determinants of types Respondents' assessment of the ethical appropriateness of payment is determined by their own characteristics. We first consider the hypothesis suggested by our model, and include (logarithmic) income, and the one obvious confound, education. Columns 1 and 4 of table 1
show that both of these significantly increase the likelihood of being an "ethicist" type. We then test for the robustness of these factors by successively adding demographic characteristics, as well as measures of political orientation and religion. Age is the only demographic that is significantly predictive of type, with older respondents being more likely an "ethicist" type. Surprisingly, conservatives are significantly more likely "ethicist" types. Finally, the 56% of respondents who claim to have previously thought about participating in a medical study as a means to earn money are significantly more likely "ethicist" types. (These respondents' mean annual household income is also smaller by a highly significant $6089.) The probit estimates exclude respondents that are classified as neutral types.
Beliefs For each type we estimate how responses to various survey questions change when the payment offered is increased from $1,000 to $10,000. We use only the first stage of the survey for these regressions. Hence, in each regression, each respondent appears as at most one observation. is the assessed likelihood that a prospective participant who rejects to participate will regret this decision. All types believe that this likelihood is higher for the $10,000 payment than for the $1,000 payment. These results are not qualitatively different when we perform the regressions separately for those respondents who were and were not provided with the ethical arguments (see below).
We do find three differences, however, when we perform the estimations using the within-subjects data. First, "ethicist" types' responses to how likely a prospective participant would be better off if he had never encountered the opportunity to participate in the trial is not significantly different across payment amounts. Second, using within-subjects data we find that even "ethicist" types are less likely to think that a participant who enrolls in the trial will regret her decision when payment is $10,000 rather than $1,000, although to a much lesser extent than "economists". Third, even "economists"
consider the decision to accept less voluntary when payment is $10,000. Note that for each of these questions, the differences in the comparative statics between "economists" and "ethicists" remain unchanged.
Effects of providing the arguments Columns 1 -3 of table 4 replicate the respective columns of table 1 for the subsample of respondents who were provided with the ethical arguments, and columns 4 -6 do the same for the subsample of respondents who were not shown any arguments. For the former subsample, only income and education remain significant predictors of type. Additionally, gender emerges as a weakly significant predictor of type, with males more likely to be "ethicist" types.
In contrast, for the latter subsample, the effect of education intensifies, and the coefficients on (log) income drop to just over half their previous value, and lose statistical significance. The remaining predictors retain similar magnitudes and significance levels as in the full sample, with the exception that the race dummies now have a significant effect.
Finally, while providing the arguments changes the incidence of the three types, it does not substantially affect the beliefs of the types. Table 5 shows that all the signs in table 2 remain unchanged when they are estimated on the subsamples of respondents who have and have not been provided with the arguments, respectively, and the magnitudes remain largely comparable.
Model and Proofs
Setup The model consists of a prospective seller s and an observer who judges the ethicality of the transaction. Agent i's utility is defined over bundles (h, m) where h is a good such as health, and m is money. The utility function of agent i is The observer's partial perspective taking is motivated by paternalistic concerns. For instance, he might believe that the seller suffers from projection bias (Loewenstein et al. (2003) ), and account for that presumed bias when judging welfare.
The observer judges the ethicality of offering the transaction to the seller by
where ∆w(h,m) = w(h,m) − w(0, 0) is the assessed change in welfare from accepting the transaction.
The transaction is judged as unethical or repugnant if E(h,m) < 0.
Implications We first study the comparative statics of incentivizing a given seller. < 0
(ii) The richer the observer, the stronger this comparative static.
(iii) Paying more money for provision of the same amount ofh is judged as more ethical:
Proof. (i) We consider a given seller, so that E = ∆w(h,m). By the chain rule and implicit differentiation, we derive
Hence, by h s = h o , we obtain (ii) From (i) we derive
which is negative due to v < 0.
(iii) This follows trivially since E is monotonic in the seller's ex post endowment m s +m.
Proposition 2. (Endowments and Preferences)
(i) Richer observers are more likely to judge a transaction as unethical: > 0.
Intuitively, the comparative statics in part (iii) of the above proposition depends on γ for the following reason. In any case, the observer recognizes that a seller with higher α i requires a higher monetary compensation to make him indifferent between accepting and rejecting the transaction. If γ is sufficiently close to 1, he acknowledges this as welfare relevant. Thus, incentivizing a seller with a higher parameter α i to give uph is judged akin to incentivizing a given seller to giving up a higher amount of good h, and hence is judged as less ethical. By contrast, if γ is close to 0, the observer does not acknowledge a higher α i as welfare relevant. Hence, such an observer only considers the fact that a seller with higher α i is given more money in exchange forh, but does not account for the fact that this is to compensate for a larger loss in utility.
By v < 0, this is negative.
(ii) We show that dE dms Us(hs−h,ms+m)=Us(hs,ms)
This is negative if and only if
The RHS of the above expression weakly exceeds 1 iff
The RHS of this expression is weakly smaller than 0 iff
By implicit differentiation of the indifference condition, we obtain
Inserting this into the first expression, we get
v (ms+m) < 1. Consequently, if γ is sufficiently close to 1, dE dαs < 0, as was to be shown.
with given payment amounts are listed in the following table.
A seller with monetary endowment 0 (1) will accept the transaction if the utility from accepting it weakly exceeds 0 (1). Consequently, for paymentm = 1 only types (m s , α s ) = (0, 1) are weakly better off accepting the transaction. Form = 3, types (m s , α s ) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 1)} accept the transaction.
Finally, form = 4, types (m s , α s ) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 1), (0, 2)} accept the transaction.
By proposition 2, part (ii), making a richer seller indifferent between accepting and rejecting is judged as more ethical, all else equal; and by proposition 1, part (iii), paying more to a type who would have accepted the transaction anyway is judged as more ethical. Consequently, raising payment from m = 1 tom = 3 is judged as more ethical, irrespective of the population distribution. By proposition 2, part (iii), if γ is sufficiently large, then offering type (0, 2) the paymentm = 3, which makes him just indifferent between accepting and rejecting the transaction, is judged as less ethical than offering type (0, 1) the paymentm = 1 that makes him indifferent. Because the ethicality of offering the transaction to a seller is the expected welfare (as judged by the observer) of those sellers who are weakly willing to accept, it is apparent that offering the transaction atm = 4 is judged as less ethical than offering the transaction atm = 3 if P (m s , α s ) = (0, 2) is sufficiently large.
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